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, lunon m military affairs, It IS undemable that 21 st century warfare will
differ dramatically from that which characterized the 20th. Perhaps most remarkable will be the maturation of "information warfare" as a tool of combat. 1
It will challenge existing warfighting doctrine, necessitate a reconceptualization
of the batdespace, and e}.'Pand the available methods and means of warfare. Of
particular note will be the impact ofinformation warfare on the principles ofintemational humanitarian law ... and vice versa.
Information warfare (IW), in particular computer network attack, has been
described in detail in this volume and elsewhere. Therefore, only a brief explanation of the typology employed in this chapter is necessary. Information warfare is a subset of information operations (10), i.e., "actions taken to affect
adversary information and information systelllS while defending one's own information and information systelllS."2 Such operations encompass virtually any
nonconsensual measures intended to discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer
data stored in a computer, manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a
computer. They can occur in peacetime, during crises, or at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of armed conflict. 3 Information operations are distinguished by that which is affected or protected-information.
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IW is narrower. It consists of "infonnation operations conducted during
time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries."4 Thus, infonnation warfare is differentiated
from other operations by the context in which it occurs-crisis or conflict. As
an example, routine peacetime espionage is an example of an infonnation operation that does not constitute infonnation warfare unless conducted during a
crisis or hostilities.
Computer network attacks (CNA), which may amount to IW or merely 10,
are "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy infonnation resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves."5 The essence ofCNA is that, regardless of the context in which it occurs, a data stream is relied on to execute the attack. 6 Thus, the means used set
CNA apart from other forms ofIO. These means vary widely. They include,
inter alia, gaining access to a computer system so as to acquire control over it,
transmitting viruses to destroy or alter data, using logic bombs that sit idle in a
system until triggered on the occasion of a particular occurrence or at a set time,
insertingwonns that reproduce themselves upon entry to a system thereby overloading the network, and employing sniffers to monitor and/or seize data.
This chapter addresses the use ofCNA during international anned conflict and
is limited to consideration of the jus in bello, that body oflaw addressing what
conduct is permissible, or impermissible, during hostilities, irrespective of the legality of the initial resort to force by the belligerents. 7 Discussion therefore centers on the use of CNA in the context of "State-on-State" anned conflict.
Moreover, the chapter is an effort to explore the lex lata, rather than an exercise
in considering lex ferenda. While setting forth lex ferenda is an especially worthy
project as the nature of warfare evolves, 8 the goal here is simply to analyze the
applicability of existing humanitarian law to computer network attack, and
identify any prescriptive lacunae that may exist therein.

Applicability of Humanitarian Law to CNA
The threshold question is whether computer network attack is even subject
to humanitarian law. To begin with, there is no provision in any humanitarian
law instrument that directly addresses CNA, or, for that matter, IW or 10; this
might suggest that CNA is as yet unregulated during anned conflict. Additionally, it could be argued that the development and employment of CNA
post-dates existing treaty law, and thus, having not been ,vithin the contemplation of the Parties to those instruments, is exempt from the coverage
thereoE A third possible argument for inapplicability is that humanitarian law
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is designed for methods and means that are kinetic in nature; since there is little
that is "physical" in CNA, attacks by computers fall outside the scope of humanitarian law. 9 Restated, humanitarian law applies to armed conflict, and
computer network attack is not "armed."
The first two possibilities are easily dispensed with. The fact that existing conventions are silent on CNA is of little significance. First, the Martens clause, a
well-accepted principle ofhumanitarian law, provides that whenever a situation
is not covered by an international agreement, "civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles ofinternational law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates
of public conscience. "10 By this norm, all occurrences during armed conflict are
subject to application of humanitarian law principles; there is no lawless void.
The acceptance of "international custom" as a source oflaw in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice also demonstrates the fallacy of any
contention of inapplicability based on the absence of specific lex scripta. 11
Arguments focusing on the fact that CNA post-dates present prescriptive instruments are similarly fallacious. Precisely this line of reasoning was presented
to the International Court ofJustice in Legality oj the Threat or Use oj Nuclear
Weapons. In its advisory opinion, the court summarily rejected the assertion that
because humanitarian "principles and rules had evolved prior to the invention of
nuclear weapons," humanitarian law was inapplicable to them. As the court
noted, "[i]n the view of the vast majority ofStates as well as writers there can be
no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons."12
There being no reason to distinguish nuclear from computer weapons, at least
on the basis of when they were developed vis-a.-vis the entry into force of relevant humanitarian law norms, the same conclusion applies to CNA. Furthermore, a review of new weapons and weapon systems for compliance with
humanitarian law is a legal, and often a policy, requirement. 13 Obviously, this
would not be so ifpre-existing law were inapplicable, ab initio, to nascent methods and means of warfare.
This analysis leaves only the third argument for inapplicability of humanitarian law to computer network attack-that it is not anned conflict, at least not in
the absence of conventional hostilities. In exploring this prospect one might reflexively reach, as some have, for the UN Charter. 14 Article 2(4) ofthat constitutive instrument proscribes the "use of force," whereas Article 51 allows for
forceful action in self-defense in the face of an "armed attack." If an act constitutes a "use offorce" or an "armed attack" would it notlogically be subject to the
laws of "armed conflict," i.e., humanitarian law? Ifso, all that need be done is to
determine what actions amount to a use offorce or constitute an armed attack. IS
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Such an analysis confuses the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello. Articles 2(4)
and 51, together with Chapter VII ofthe Charter, are the key prescriptive nonns
ofthe jus ad bellum. They govern when it is legitimate under international law (or
at least Charter law) to resort to force, either as a tool of national policy or in the
face ofanother State's decision to do so in pursuit ofits own national interests. A
State that has unlawfully resorted to force may subsequently carry out its operations in compliance with the jus in bello, which, as mentioned supra, governs
the actual conduct of hostilities by the parties. For instance, during the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict Argentina wrongfully invaded British territory, but
generally abided by the rules of warfare. Similarly, many commentators urge
that Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO's 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign,
violated the jus ad bellum, but was conducted in substantial compliance with the
laws governing armed conflict. 16 Conversely, a State (or its military) that lawfully resorts to force may subsequently violate humanitarian law principles. As an
example, it seems clear that Russia is entitled to maintain order in Chechnya; but
it is equally clear that in doing so its forces have regularly violated both the law of
non-international armed conflict and human rights law. 17 The point is that the
jus ad bellum and jus in bello are normatively distinct. Professor Leslie Green has
very pragmatically noted this distinction and its relevance to military personnel:
Members of the anned forces are not concerned with the manner in which a
conflict begins, nor whether it is legal or illegal. So far as they are concerned, the
law of anned conflict comes into operation and they must abide by it from the
moment that hostilities begin and they are required to participate therein. IS

The task at hand, therefore, is to query when "hostilities" have begun.
Tautologically, the answer is that hostilities commence once humanitarian law
applies. Common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that
the conventions apply, aside from specific provisions that pertain in peacetime,
"to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more ofthe High Contracting Parties, even ifthe state ofwar is not
recognized by one of them. "19 The 1977 Protocol Additional I, which, like the
conventions pertains to international armed conflict, adopts the same "armed
conflict" standard, one that has become an accepted customary law threshold for
humanitarian law. 20 The fact that the 1977 Protocol Additional II also embraces
the term "armed conflict,"21 albeit in the context of non-international armed
conflict, demonstrates that armed conflict is a condition determined by its nature, rather than its participants,2210cation,23 or, as was formerly the case with
"war," declaration of the belligerents. 24
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It seems relatively clear, then, that humanitarian law is activated through the
commencement of armed conflict. But what is armed conflict? Commentaries
published by the International Committee ofthe Red Cross to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Protocols Additional take a very expansive approach
towards the meaning of the term. The former define armed conflict as "[a]ny
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention if armed
forces . .. even ifone of the Parties denies the existence ofa state ofwar. It makes
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. "25
Similarly, Protocol Additional I's commentary provides that "humanitarian
law ... covers any dispute between two States involving the use if their armed
forces. Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its intensity, playa role .... "26
Protocol Additional II's commentary describes armed conflict as "the existence
ofopen hostilities between armedforces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree."27 The sine qua non in all three cases is commitment of armed forces.
But a dispute or difference resulting in the engagement of armed forces cannot be the sole criterion. Military forces are used on a regular basis against adversaries \vithout necessarily producing a state of armed conflict-consider aerial
reconnaissance/surveillance operations as just one example. Further, it is now
generally accepted that isolated incidents such as border clashes or small-scale
raids do not rise to the level ofarmed conflict as that term is employed in humanitarian law. 28 Accordingly, State practice, supplemented by the writings of publicists, illustrates that Protocol Additional I's dismissal of intensity and duration
has proven slighdy overstated.
Instead, the reference to armed forces is more logically understood as a form
of prescriptive shorthand for activity of a particular nature and intensity. At the
time the relevant instruments were drafted, armed forces were the entities that
conducted the contemplated activity at the requisite level ofintensity; by focusing on the armed forces, the intended ends were achieved. Restated, the relevant provisions of the conventions and their commentaries were actor-based
because citing the actors engaged in the undesirable conduct-armed
forces-was, at the time, a convenient and reliable method for regulating it.
And what was that conduct? The logical answer is found in the underlying
purposes of humanitarian law. A review of its instruments and principles
makes clear that protecting individuals who are not involved in the hostilities
direcdy, as well as their property, lies at their core.29 Most notably, protected
entities include civilians and civilian objects, as well as those who are hors de
combat (e.g., wounded or captured personnel) or provide humanitarian services
(e.g., medical personnel). As for the protection they are entided to, it is usually
framed in terms of injury or death or, in the case of property, damage or
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destruction. These Geneva law purposes are complemented by Hague law
norms intended to limit suffering generally through restrictions on certain
weaponry and methods of warfare. 30
This excessively abbreviated summarization of humanitarian law's fundamental purposes elucidates the term armed conflict. Armed conflict occurs
when a group takes measures that injure, kill, damage, or destroy. Also included
are actions intended to cause such results or in which they are the foreseeable
consequences thereof Because the issue is the jus in bello rather than ad bellum,
the motivation underlying the actions is irrelevant. So too is their wrongfulness
or legitimacy. Thus, for example, the party that commences the armed conflict
by committing such acts may be acting in legitimate anticipatory (or interceptive) self-defense; nevertheless, as long as the actions were intended to injure,
kill, damage, or destroy, humanitarian law governs them. It should be noted that
given the current weight of opinion, actions that are sporadic or isolated in
nature would not suffice. Additionally, because the issue is the law applicable to
international armed conflict, the relevant actions must be attributable to a
State. 31
Returning to the topic at hand, and quite aside from ad bellum issues, humanitarian law principles apply whenever computer network attacks can be ascribed
to a State, are more than merely sporadic and isolated incidents, and are either
intended to cause injury, death, damage, or destruction (and analogous effects),
or such consequences are foreseeable. This is so even though classic amled force
is not being employed. By this standard, a computer network attack on a large
airport's air traffic control system by agents ofanother State would implicate humanitarian law. So too would an attack intended to destroy oil pipelines by surging oil through them after taking control of computers governing flow,32
causing the meltdown of a nuclear reactor by manipulation ofits computerized
nerve center, or using computers to trigger a release oftoxic chemicals from production and storage facilities. On the other hand, humanitarian law would not
pertain to disrupting a university intranet, downloading financial records, shutting down Internet access temporarily, or conducting cyber espionage because,
even ifpart of a regular campaign ofsimilar acts, if the foreseeable consequences
would not include injury, death, damage, or destruction.
It should be apparent that, given advances in methods and means of warfare,
especially information warfare, it is no longer sufficient to apply an actor-based
threshold for application of humanitarian law; instead, a consequence-based
one is more appropriate. This is hardly a jurisprudential epiphany. No one
would deny, for instance, that biological or chemical warfare (which does not
involve delivery by kinetic weapons) is subject to humanitarian law. A

192

Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the Jus in Bello

consequence-based threshold is also supported by the fact that once anned
conflict has commenced (and except for prohibitions relevant to particular
weapons), the means by which injury, death, damage or destruction are produced have no bearing on the legality of the causal act. Intentionally targeting a
civilian or other protected persons or objects is unlawful irrespective of the
method or means used. Starvation, suffocation, beating, shooting, bombing,
even cyber attack-all are subject to humanitarian law based on the fact that a
particular consequence results. That this is so counters any assertion that,
standing alone, cyber attacks are not subject to humanitarian law because they
are not "anned" force. On the contrary, they mayor may not be, depending
on their nature and likely consequences.

Computer Network Attack Targets
As has been discussed, computer network attacks are subject to humanitarian
law if they are part and parcel ofeither a classic conflict or a "cyber war" in which
injury, death, damage, or destruction are intended or foreseeable. This being so,
it is necessary to consider the targets against which computer network attacks
may be directed.
A useful starting point is to frame the conduct that is subject to the prescriptive norms governing targeting. Because most relevant Protocol Additional I
provisions articulate standards applicable to Parties and non-Parties (as a restatement of binding customary law) alike, that instrument serves as an apt point of
departure. 33 Article 48, the basic rule governing the protection of the civilian
population, provides that "Parties to the conflict ... shall direct their operations
only against military objectives. "34 On its face, Article 48 would seem to rule out
any military operation, including CNA, directed against other than purely military objectives. In fact, it does not. In subsequent articles, proscriptions are routinely expressed in terms of "attacks." Thus, "the civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack"35; "civilian objects
shall not be the object ofattack"36; "indiscriminate attacks are forbidden"37; "attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives"38; and so forth. The tenn is
expressly defined in Article 49: '''Attacks' means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence." As a general matter then, the prohibition is not so much on targeting non-military objectives as it is on attacking
them, specifically through the use of violence. This interpretation is supported
by the text of Article 51, which sets forth the general principle that the" civilian
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers
arising from military operations," and which prohibits "acts or threats of violence
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the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population,"39 as well as the commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word
'operation' should be understood in the context of the whole of the Section; it
refers to military operations during which violence is used."4o
In light of this interpretation, does computer network attack fall outside the
ambit of "attacks" because it does not employ violence? No, and for precisely
the same reason that armed attacks can include cyber attacks. "Attacks" is a term
of prescriptive shorthand intended to address specific consequences. It is clear
that what the relevant provisions hope to accomplish is shielding protected individuals from injury or death and protected objects from damage or destruction.
To the extent the term "violence" is explicative, it must be considered in the
sense of violent consequences rather than violent acts. Significant human physical
or mental suffering41 is logically included in the concept of injury; permanent
loss of assets, for instance money, stock, etc., direcdy transferable into tangible
property likewise comprises damage or destruction. The point is that inconvenience, harassment, or mere diminishment in quality oflife does not suffice; human suffering is the requisite criterion. As an example, a major disruption of the
stock market or banking system might effectively collapse the economy and result in widespread unemployment, hunger, mental anguish, etc., a reality tragically demonstrated during the Depression ofthe 1930s. Ifit did cause this level of
suffering, the CNA would constitute an attack, as that term is understood in humanitarian law.
Other articles within the section sustain this reading. For instance, the rules of
proportionality speak of "loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilians objects, or a combination thereof,"42 those relating to protection of the environment refer to "widespread, long-term, and severe damage,"43 and the
protection of dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations is framed in
terms of "severe losses among the civilian population."44 Furthermore, during
the negotiation of Protocol Additional I, the issue ofwhether laying landrnines
constituted an attack arose. Most agreed that it did because "there is an attack
whenever a person is direcdy endangered by a mine laid. "45 By analogy, a computer network attack which foreseeably endangers protected persons or property would amount to an attack.
Return now to Article 48. In the context of computer network attack, and as
a general rule (various other specific prohibitions are discussed infra), the article
would prohibit those CNA operations directed against non-military objectives
that are intended to, or would foreseeably, cause injury, death, damage, or destruction. Unless otherwise prohibited by specific provisions of humanitarian
law, CNA operations unlikely to result in the aforementioned consequences are
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pennissible against non-military objectives, such as the population. 46 As a result
of this distinction, the need to carefully aSsess whether or not an infonnation
warfare operation is oris not an "attack" is gready heightened. In the past, analysis of this matter approximated a res ipsa [oquitor approach. However, CNA is
much more ambiguous than traditional military operations, thereby demanding
a more challenging consequence-based consideration.
While CNA does dramatically expand the possibilities for "targeting" (but
not attacking) non-military objectives, it is unfair to characterize this as a weakening of the prescriptive architecture. Instead, it simply represents an expansion
of pennissible methods and means resulting from advances in technology; existing norms remain intact. Recall, for example, that psychological operations directed against the civilian population that cause no physical hann are entirely
pennissible, so long as they are not intended to terrorize. 47 This is so whether the
motivation for the operations is military in nature or not. Nevertheless, although
the objective regime is a constant, the advent ofCNA reveals a nonnative lacuna
that, unless filled, will inevitably result in an expansion ofwar's impact on the civilian population.
Assuming a CNA operation is an "attack," what can be targeted? Analytically, potential targets can be classified into three broad categories: 1) combatants and military objectives; 2) civilians and civilian objects; and 3) dual-use
objects. Moreover, particular types ofpotential targets enjoy specific protection.
It is useful to address each grouping separately.
Combatants and military objectives: Combatants and military objectives are by
nature valid targets and may be direcdy attacked as long as the method used, as
discussed in the next section, is consistent with humanitarian law restrictions.
Those who plan or decide on attacks have an affinnative duty to "do everything
feasible" to verify that intended targets are legitimate, i.e., that they do not enjoy
immunity from attack under humanitarian law. 48
A combatant is a member of the armed forces other than medical personnel
and chaplains; anned forces include "all organized anned forces, groups and
units which are under a command responsible to [a Party to the conflict] for the
conduct ofits subordinates.... [They must] be subject to an internal disciplinary
system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules ofinternational
law applicable in anned conflict. "49 Directing computer network attacks against
combatants, for instance by causing a military air traffic control system to transmit false navigational infonnation in order to cause a military troop transport to
crash, is clearly pennissible.
Military objectives are defined in Article 52 ofProtocol Additional I as "those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
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contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite advantage. "50 Military equipment and facilities, other than medical and religious
items, are clearly military objectives, and thereby subject to direct computer network attack. However, determining which objects are military objectives
beyond these obvious exemplars is often difficult. 51 The problem lies in ascertaining the required nexus between the object to be attacked and military
operations.
The crux of the dilemma is interpretation of the terms" effective" and" definite." Some, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, define
them very narrowly. In the ICRC commentary to the protocol, effective contribution includes objects" directly used by the armed forces" (e.g., weapons and
equipment), locations of "special importance for military operations" (e.g.,
bridges), and objects intended for use or being used for military purposes. 52 As to
"definite military advantage," the commentary excludes attacks that offer only a
"potential or indeterminate" advantage. 53 By contrast, the United States, which
does not dispute the wording of the definition, would include economic targets
that "indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability," a particularly expansive interpretation. 54
This difference has interesting implications for computer network attack.
Can a banking system be attacked because wealth underpins a military's
sustainability? What about the ministry responsible for taxation? The stock market?
Are attacks on brokerage firms acceptable because they will undermine willingness to invest in the economy? Ifa country disproportionately relies on a particular industry to provide export income (e.g., oil), can computer network attack
be used to disrupt production and distribution? The issue of striking economic
targets is a particularly acute one because the operation of most is computer intense in nature, and thereby very appealing to information warfare targeteers.
The threshold issue, recalling the discussion supra, is whether or not the attack
would cause injury, death, damage, or destruction. Once this determination is
made, the differing interpretations of military objective would come into play,
in all likelihood leading to disparate results on the legitimacy of striking the target. On the other hand, if the operation were designed to cause, e.g., mere inconvenience, it would not rise to the level of an attack and would thus be
permissible regardless of the target's nexus, or lack thereof, to military operations. For instance, if the Serbian State television station had been targeted by
CNA rather than kinetic weapons during NATO strikes on Belgrade in April
1999, there might well have been no consequent injury, death, damage, or destruction; in that circumstance, criticism on the basis that a civilian target had
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been hit would likely have fallen on deaf ears, thereby probably avoiding the
negative publicity that resulted, as well as the pending litigation in the European
Court of Human Rights. 55
Civilians and dvilian objects: Civilians are those not considered combatants,56
whereas a civilian object is one that is not a military objective.57 The prohibition
on attacking civilians and civilian objects is nearly absolute. Specifically, Protocol Additional I provides:
Article 51.2. The civilian population, as such, as well as individual civilians shall
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
Article 52. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. 58

Doubts as to the character ofan object or individual are to be resolved in :favor
of finding civilian status. 59 Again, in the case of computer network attack, the
threshold question is whether or not the attack is intended to, or forseeably will,
cause injury, death, damage, or destruction; ifso, the prohibitions set forth earlier, which undeniably restate existing customary law, apply.
Unfortunately, the norms, albeit clear on their face, are subject to interpretive
difficulties. The differing standards for distinguishing civilian objects from military objectives have already been highlighted. Similar disparities surround when
a civilian may be attacked. Protocol Additional I allows for this possibility only
in the case ofa civilian taking a "direct part in hostilities," a standard described in
the commentary as "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to
cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces. "60
This is the illegal combatant problem. Some would limit civilian immunity even
more severely by, for instance, characterizing mission-essential civilians working at a base during hostilities, though not engaged direcdy in acts of war, as legitimate targets. 61
In the context of information operations, the civilian issue is an important
one. Some countries have elected to contract out information warfare functions, whether those functions involve the maintenance of assets or the conduct
of operations. Moreover, computer network attack is a function that may be
tasked to government agencies other than the military. In the event civilian contractors or non-military personnel are in a support role that is essential to the
conduct of operations, for instance maintaining CNA equipment, by the latter
interpretation they would be direcdy targetable. Further, because they are valid
targets, any injury caused them would not be calculated when assessing whether
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an attack is proportional (see discussion infra). On the other hand, narrowly applying the "direct part in hostilities" standard would preserve the protection
they enjoy as civilians, though if captured they would be entided to prisoner of
war status as persons "accompanying the armed forces."62
Should civilians engage in computer network attack themselves, the problem
becomes more complex. If the CNA results, or foreseeably could result, in injury, death, damage, or destruction, then the "perpetrators" would be illegal
combatants. This status attaches because they have taken a direct part in hostilities without complying with the criteria for characterization as a combatant. As
illegal combatants, they may be direcdy attacked, any injury suffered by them
would be irrelevant in a proportionality calculation, and in the event of their
capture they would not be entided to prisoner of war status.
By contrast, if the civilians involved were conducting computer network operations that did not rise to the level of "attacks, " they would not be illegal combatants because they would have committed no "acts ofwar that by their nature
or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the
enemy armed forces." Their civilian status and its corresponding protections
would remain intact. Nevertheless, as with support personnel, if captured while
attached to a military unit and accompanying that unit, these civilians would be
classed as prisoners ofwar. 63 Ofcourse, the facility and equipment being used to
conduct the operations might well be valid military objectives and, as a result, be
subject to attack; but the operators themselves could not be direcdy attacked.
As should be apparent, the use of civilians, whether contractors or government employees, is fraught with legal pitfalls. Clearly, a prudent approach would
be to employ military personnel for information warfare purposes.
Dual-use objects: A dual-use object is one that serves both civilian and military
purposes. Examples of common dual-use objects (or objectives) include airports, rail lines, electrical systems, communications systems, factories that produce items for both the military and the civilian population, and satellites such as
INTELSAT, EUROSAT andARABSAT. Ifan object is being used for military
purposes, it is a military objective vulnerable to attack, including computer network attack. This is true even if the military purposes are secondary to the civilian ones.
Several caveats are in order. First, whether or not an object is a military objective may tum on whether the narrow or broad definition of the term, a matter
discussed supra, is used. Second, whether an object is dual-use, and therefore a
military objective, will depend on the nature of the specific conflict. An airfield
may be utilized for logistics purposes in one conflict, but serve no military function in another. Third, an object that has the potential for military usage, but is
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presently solely used for civilian purposes, is a military objective ifthe likelihood
of use is reasonable and not remote in the context of the particular conflict underway. Finally, dual-use objects must be carefully measured against the requirements of discrimination and proportionality, discussed infra, because by
definition an attack thereon risks collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians or civilian objects.
Specffically protected objects: In addition to the general rules regarding the protection of the civilian population, certain objects enjoy specific protection. A controversial category of specially protected objects is dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical
generating stations. Because of their reliance on computer and computer networks, such facilities are especially vulnerable to CNA. Article 56 of Protocol Additional I, a provision opposed by the United States, forbids an attack on these
facilities if the attack might "cause the release of dangerous forces [e.g., water or
radioactivity] and consequent severe losses among the civilian population."64 This
prohibition applies even if they are military objectives. Interestingly, CNA offers a
fairly reliable means of neutralizing such facilities without risking the release of
dangerous forces, a difficult task when using kinetic weapons.
Conducting attacks that starve the civilian population or otherwise deny it
"indispensable objects,"65 even if enemy armed forces are the intended "victims," is prohibited. 66 Indispensable objects include such items as "foodstuffi,
crops, livestock, or drinking water. Applying this restriction, computer networks attacks against, for instance, a food storage and distribution system or a
water treatment plant serving the civilian population would be impermissible
even if military forces also rely on them.
Protocol Additional I further prohibits military operations likely to cause
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment,67 although the
United States does not recognize the provision as a restatement of customary
law. Computer network attacks might conceivably cause such devastation. An
attack on a nuclear reactor could result in a meltdown ofits core and consequent
release of radioactivity. Similarly, CNA could be used to release chemicals from
a storage or production facility or rupture a major oil pipeline. Many other possibilities for the causation ofenvironmental damage through CNA exist. It is important to note that the prohibition applies regardless of whether or not the
attack is targeted against a valid military objective and even if it complies with
the principle of proportionality. Once the requisite quantum of damage is expected to occur, the operation is prohibited.
There are a number of other objects, persons, and activities that enjoy special
protected status, and which are susceptible to computer network attack, but
which do not present unique CNA opportunities or challenges. For example,
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military and civilian medical units and supplies are exempt from attack unless being used for military purposes;68 the same is generally true ofmedical transport. 69
So too are cultural objects, places ofworship,70 and civil defense shelters, facilities, and material.7 1 Additionally, humanitarian relief activities must not be interfered with.72 By these prohibitions, for example, a computer network attack
to alter blood type information in a hospital's data bank, deny power to a bomb
shelter, or misroute humanitarian relief supplies would all be unlawful. Of
course, misuse ofprotected items or locations for military purposes renders them
valid military objectives that may be attacked.
Finally, there are limitations on striking certain objects or individuals in reprisal, including reprisals by computer network attack. Reprisals are othenvise unlawful actions taken during armed conflict in response to an adversary's own
unlawful conduct. They must be designed solely to cause the adversary to act
lawfully, be preceded by a warning (if feasible), be proportionate to the adversary's violation, and cease as soon as the other side complies with the legallimitations on its conduct. The right to conduct reprisals has been severely restricted in
treaty law, much of which expresses customary law. There are specific prohibitions on reprisals conducted against civilians; prisoners of war; the wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel and their equipment;
protected buildings, equipment, and vessels; civilian objects; cultural objects;
objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population; works containing dangerous forces; and the environment.73 Essentially, this leaves only combatants and military objectives subject to reprisals. Of course, in most cases a
computer network attack conducted against them would be lawful at any rate. 74
In fairness, it should be acknowledged that certain countries argue that the
Protocol Additional I restrictions on reprisals fail to reflect customary law. The
United States, while accepting that most reprisals against civilians would be inappropriate (and illegitimate), asserts that the absolute prohibition thereon "removes a significant deterrent that presently protects civilians and other war
victims on all sides of the conflict."75 The United Kingdom issued a reservation
on precisely the same point when it became a Party to the protocoI.76 For these
and other countries that have adopted this position, reprisatory computer network attacks are issues of policy, not law.

Limits on Striking Legitimate Targets
The core prescriptions on striking legitimate targets are based in the principle
of discrimination.77 It is this principle which most clearly e:h."}Jresses humanitarian law's balancing of State-centric interests in resorting to force against the
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more broadly based humanitarian interest in shielding non-participants from the
effects of what is, at best, an unfortunate necessity.
Discrimination is bifurcated in nature. Applied to weapons, it limits the use of
those that are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and military objectives on the one hand and civilians, civilian objects, and other protected entities on the other. Applied to tactics and the use ofweapons, it requires an effort
to distinguish between the two categories when conducting military operations.
Protocol Additional I articulates this difference in Article 51.4:
Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means ofcombat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol; and consequendy, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Subparagraph (a) refers to indiscriminate use, whereas (b) and (c) describe
indiscriminate weapons. The indiscriminate use aspect ofdiscrimination consists
of three related components-rustinction, proportionality, and minimizing
collateral damage and incidental injuryJ8
Illdiscrimillate weapom: Computer network attacks are mounted by a weapon
system consisting of a computer, computer code, and a means by which that
code is transmitted. Obviously, the computer itself is not indiscriminate for it
can very discretely send code to particular computers and networks. The sending of e-mail is an apt example. By contrast, code can be written that is very,
perhaps intentionally, indiscriminate. The classic example is a virus that passes
from computer to computer free from the control ofits originator. Because the
code, even ifan uncontrollable virus, can be targeted at particular military objectives, it is not indiscriminate on the basis that it cannot be directed. However,
such code may be indiscriminate on the ground that its dfects cannot be limited.
In many cases, once viral code is launched against a target computer or network,
the attacker will have no way to limit its subsequent retransmission. This may be
true even in a closed network, for the virus could, as an example, be transferred
into it by diskette. Simply put, malicious code likely to be uncontrollably spread
throughout civilian systems is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon.
One must be careful not to overstate the restriction. Note that Article 51.4
cites "methods and means of combat." A means of combat is defined in Protocol Additional I's commentary as a "weapon," whereas a method of combat is
the way a weapon is usedJ9 The plain meaning of "weapon" is something that
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can be used to attack an adversary. Drawing on the analysis supra regarding the
humanitarian law term "attacks," computer code is only part of a weapon system when it can cause the effects encompassed in that term-injury, death,
damage, and destruction (including related effects like severe mental suffering,
terror, suffering, etc.). In the event it cannot, it is not part of a weapon system,
and thus would not be prohibited, at least not on the ground that it is
indiscriminate.
Distinction: The prindple of distinction, unquestionably part of customary humanitarian law, is set forth in Protocol Additional I, Article 48: "[T]he Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Whereas the prohibition on attacking civilians direcdy rendered a specific category of potential
targets off-limits, the distinction requirement extends protection to cases in
which an attack may not be directed against civilian or civilian objectives specifically, but in which there is a high likelihood ofstriking them nonetheless. An example would be firing a weapon, though capable of being aimed, blindly.
This is a particularly relevant prohibition in the context ofcomputer network
attack. For example, it would embrace situations where it is possible to discretely target a military objective through a particular means of CNA, but instead a broad attack likely to affect civilian systems is launched. Such an attack
would be analogous to the Iraqi SCUD attacks against Saudi and Israeli population centers during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. so The SCUD is not an inherendy indiscriminate weapon. Indeed, it is easily capable ofbeing aimed with
sufficient accuracy against, for instance, military formations in the desert. However, use of SCUDS against population centers was indiscriminate even if the
Iraqi intent was to strike military objectives situated therein; the likelihood of
striking protected persons and objects so outweighed that of hitting legitimate
, targets that the use was improper. Given the interconnectivity of computer systems today, computer network attacks could readily be launched in an analogous fashion.
Proportionality: Sdenter distinguishes the principle ofproportionality from that
of distinction. Distinction limits direct attacks on protected persons or objects
and those in which there is culpable disregard for civilian consequences. By contrast, proportionality governs those situations in which harm to protected persons or objects is the foreseeable consequence of an attack, but not its intended
purpose. The principle is most often violated (sometimes in an unintended but
culpably negligent fashion) as a result of: 1) lack ofsufficient knowledge or understanding of what is being attacked; 2) an inability to surgically craft the
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amount of "force" being applied against a target; and 3) the inability to ensure
the weapon strikes precisely the right aim point. 81 All three pitfalls could surface
in the context of computer network attack.
As set forth in Protocol Additional I, an attack is indiscriminate as violative of
the principle of proportionality when it "may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."82 A concrete and direct advantage is "substantial and relatively closer;] ... advantages which are hardly perceptible and those
which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded. "83 Moreover,
the advantage calculated is that resulting from the overall operation, not the individual attack itse1£84
Basically, the principle ofproportionality mandates a balancing test-one that
is especially difficult to conduct because differing entities (suffering and damage
v. military advantage) are being compared against each other in the absence of a
common system of valuation. How should civilian passenger lives be weighed
against military aircraft in a computer network attack on an air traffic control system? How much human suffering is acceptable when shutting down an electrical grid that serves both military and civilian purposes? Can computer network
attacks be conducted against telecommunications if they result in degrading
emergency response services for the civilian population? Complicating matters
is the fact that the answers to these and similar questions, assuming there are any
"right" answers, is contextual because the military advantage resulting from an
attack always depends on the state ofhostilities at the time. 85 Acknowledging the
difficulty involved in making these types of determinations, the Protocol Additional I commentary notes that" [pJutting these provisions into practice ... will
require complete good faith on the part ofthe belligerents, as well as the desire to
conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population."86
Further complicating matters is the issue of reverberating effects, i.e., those
effects not direcdy and immediately caused by the attack, but nevertheless the
product thereof-it is the problem of the effects caused by the effects of an attack. The most cited example involves the attack on the Iraqi electrical grid
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although it successfully disrupted Iraqi
command and control, the attack also denied electricity to the civilian population (a "first-tier" effect), thereby affecting hospitals, refrigeration, emergency
response, etc. Similarly, when NATO struck at Yugoslavia's electrical supply
network during Operation ALLIED FORCE, one consequence was shutting
down drinking water pumping stations. 87 Such attacks set off "second-tier"
suffering (a reverberating effect) of the population. Obviously, precisely the
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same effects could have resulted had the attacks been conducted through
CNA. Indeed, the problem of reverberating effects looms much larger in computer network than kinetic attacks due to the interconnectivity of computers,
particularly that between military and civilian systems.
Reverberating effects bear on proportionality analysis because they must be
considered when balancing collateral damage and incidental injury against
military advantage. Unfortunately, and whether reverberating or direct, it is
difficult to assess such damage and injury when caused by computer network
attack absent an understanding of how the computer systems involved function
and to which other systems they are linked. Despite this obstacle, planners and
decision-makers have an affirmative duty to attempt to avoid collateral damage
and incidental injury whenever feasible, a duty that necessarily implies an effort
to ascertain the resultant damage or injury from an attack. 88 Given the complexity of computer network attack, the high likelihood ofan impact on civilian systems, and the relatively low understanding ofits nature and effects on the part of
those charged with ordering the attacks, computer e}.l'erts will have to be available to assess potential collateral and incidental effects throughout the mission
planning process. 89 Additionally, modeling and simulation, like that already
conducted for nuclear weapons, would prove invaluable in identifying possible
reverberating effects; conducting them prior to the outbreak of hostilities-free
from the fog, friction, and pace of war-would be well advised.
Minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury: Proportionality determinations establish whether a military objective may be attacked at all. However,
even if the selected target is legitimate and the planned attack thereon would be
proportional, the attacker has an obligation to select that method or means of
warfare likely to cause the least collateral damage and incidental injury, all other
things being equal (such as risk to the forces conducting the attack, likelihood of
success, weapons inventory, etc.).90 Additionally, whenever a choice is presented between military objectives that can be attacked to achieve a desired
result, the attack which risks the least collateral damage and incidental injury
must be chosen. 91
The availability of computer network attack actually expands the options for
minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. Whereas in the past physical
destruction may have been necessary to neutralize a target's contribution to the
enemy's efforts, now it may be possible to simply "tum it off." For instance,
rather than bombing an airfield, air traffic control can be interrupted. The same
is true of power production and distribution systems, communications, industrial plants, and so forth. Those who plan and execute such operations must still
be concerned about collateral damage, incidental injury, and reverberating
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effects (consider the Iraqi electric grid example supra), but the risks associated
with conducting classic kinetic warfare are mitigated significandy through
CNA. Additionally, depending on the desired result, it may be possible to simply interrupt operation of the target. This tactic would be particularly attractive
in the case of dual-use objectives. Consider an electrical grid. It might only be
militarily necessary to shut the system down for a short period, for example, immediately preceding and during an assault. The system could be brought back up
as soon as the pressing need for its interruption passed, thereby limiting the negative effects on the civilian population. Along the same lines, because targets are
not physically damaged, and thus do not need to be repaired or rebuilt, the civilian population's return to normalcy at the end of the conflict would be
facilitated.
There is, from a humanitarian point ofview, one theoretical downside to the
fact that CNA may sometimes cause less collateral damage and incidental injury
than kinetic attacks-it might actually encourage attacks. This would be so in
the case of an attack that could not pass the proportionality test if conducted
kinetically, but could if accomplished by computer network attack. Should the
CNA result in any collateral damage or incidental injury (albeit not enough to
outweigh the resulting military advantage), the net result would be greater civilian suffering. While this is true, the better question from the humanitarian point
ofview is whether CNA causes more or less collateral damage and incidental injury overall, not merely as to a single operation. So long as the various limitations
ofthe principle ofdiscrimination are complied with, and without the benefit ofa
track record to draw on in making the assertion, it would seem that in humanitarian terms computer network attack is probably a step forward.
Perfidy: Although the core normative constraints on computer network attack derive from the principle of discrimination, several other related aspects of
humanitarian law are implicated by this new means ofwarfare. One is the prohibition on perfidy. Perfidy is the feigning of protected status in order to take advantage ofan adversary. Examples include pretending to be wounded or sick, to
enjoy non-combatant status, or to surrender, and improperly displaying symbols
that signifY protected status, such as the red cross or red crescent. Perfidy is distinguished from ruses, which are acts intended to mislead an adversary and cause
him to act recklessly, but which do not involve false claims of protected status.
Ruses are lawful.
Information warfare, including computer network attack, opens many opportunities for ruses and perfidy. This is because both techniques are intended to
convey false information. For instance, lawful ruses might include transmitting
false data, meant to be intercepted by an adversary, regarding troop disposition
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or movements. Alternatively, it might involve altering data in an adversary's intelligence databases, sending messages to enemy headquarters purporting to be
from subordinate units, or passing instructions to subordinate units that appear
to be from their headquarters. 92 All such activities would be perfectly legitimate.
On the other hand, any action intended to mislead the enemy into believing
that one's forces enjoyed protected status in order to kill, injure, or capture the
enemy would be illegitimate. 93 For instance, medical units and transports may
use codes and signals established by the International Telecommunications
Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International
Maritime Consultative Orgaci.zation to identifY themselves. 94 Falsely transmitting such code/signals or, a more likely prospect in the computer network attack
context, causing adversary systems to reflect receipt of such signals would be
clear examples ofperfidy. The Department ofDefense has also opined that using
"computer 'morphing' techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief of
state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been
signed" would be a war crime if false. 95
An interesting prospect would be routing a computer network attack
through civilian systems, or otherwise feigning a civilian source. This might be
done to later mask the source ofattack or to inspire confidence in the target that
the transmission was benign. Doing so would be prohibited both by the Protocol Additional I and customary law. 96 This is a very sensible restriction because a
response to an attack apparently originating from a civilian source could be
kinetic in nature.
It must be noted that the protocol's restriction on perfidy is limited to conduct calculated to facilitate killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary. The
commentary thereto notes this limitation, but suggests that "there is more to
an international treaty than the literal reading of all the words in the document
may suggest; it represents one step forward in the ongoing evolution in relations between States."97 Be that as it may, as the law stands today it would be
permissible to disguise information warfare operations as civilian in origin if
they were not related to killing, injuring, or capturing one's adversary. This
standard is consistent with that employed supra regarding "armed" conflict and
"attack." Moreover, the prohibition on misuse of protective codes and signals,
such as those designed to identifY medical facilities, are absolute, i.e., they apply regardless of the abuser's intent. As an example, usage merely to avoid attack is forbidden.
Civilian Shields: In theory, a computer attack might utilize a civilian network to shield itself against a response, either kinetic or through a countercyber attack. If the latter did not cause death or injury to civilians or damage
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or destruction of protected objects, and therefore was not an "attack" in the
humanitarian law sense, it would be permissible. On the other hand, ifit might
cause collateral damage or incidental injury, then any such effects on the civilian population would have to be considered in a proportionality analysis; civilians and civilian objects do not lose the protections of the law of armed conflict
by the wrongful acts of others. Of course, the use of civilian shields is itself
wrongful;98 the party that subjects the civilian population or protected objects
to risk by using them as shields is culpable under humanitarian law. This principle applies whether the attack is kinetic or computer in nature.
Mercenaries: Since computer network attacks can amount to both armed conflict and, in individual cases, an attack, restrictions on mercenaries may apply to
those who conduct them. Mercenaries are specifically addressed in Protocol
Additional I, although the restrictions contained therein are not customary in
nature, a position strengthened by the absence ofany mention of mercenaries in
the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
By Article 47 of the protocol, a mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;

(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as
a member of its armed forces. 99

While Protocol Additional I does not actually prohibit mercenarism, because
they are not combatants, mercenaries are not entitled to prisoner of war status.
Therefore, like any other noncombatant who directly engages in hostilities, they
may be tried under the domestic law of the State that captures them. 100
Given the complexity of conducting computer network attacks, it is quite
conceivable that States might hire non-nationals possessing the requisite expertise to mount them. If the CNA amount to an "attack," these individuals
would be taking a "direct part in the hostilities." Assuming they met the other
qualifying criteria for mercenaries, the Protocol Additional I provisions would
apply. Interestingly, there is a financial incentive to outsource CNA because in
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many cases hiring computer attack expertise would be far more cost-effective
than hiring conventional attack mercenaries or even acquiring weapons for
one's own forces.

Conclusion
By and large, as information warfare capabilities increase, existing humanitarian prescriptive norms will suffice to maintain the protection civilians, civilian
objects, and other protected entities enjoy. However, certain novel aspects of
CNA do pose new and sometimes troubling quandaries. The unease over the
use of cyber warfare during NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 is
compelling evidence that the question of how humanitarian law bears on CNA
remains unsetded. 101
First, in order to apply extant norms to CNA, it is necessary to accept various interpretive premises. Most important are the consequence-based interpretations of "armed conflict" and "attack." Absent such understandings, the
applicability, and therefore adequacy, of present-day humanitarian law principles would fall into question. Interestingly, consideration of computer network attack in the context of the jus ad bellum also leads to consequence-based
interpretation. 102
Second, even accepting the parameters resulting from the interpretations suggested, normative lacunae exist. Most notably, attacks against civilians and civilian objects that do not injure, kill, damage, or destroy (or otherwise produce the
requisite level of suffering) are by and large permissible. Given that kinetic attacks usually have such effects, civilians and civilian objects enjoy broad protection during conventional military operations. However, computer network
attack, because it may not amount to an attack, opens up many possibilities for
targeting otherwise protected persons and objects. The incentive for conducting
such operations grows in relation to the extent to which the "war aims" of the
party conducting the CNA are coercive in nature; the desire to, e.g., "tum out
the lights" to a civilian population in order motivate it to pressure its leadership
to take, or desist from taking, a particular course of conduct (a step suggested by
NATO's air commander during Operation ALLIED FORCE) will grow as the
means for doing so expand. 103 This is an especially negative reality in humanitarian terms.
Third, and more encouraging, is the fact that CNA may make it possible to
achieve desired military objectives with less collateral damage and incidental injury than in traditional kinetic attacks. Indeed, in certain cases, military commanders will be obligated to employ their cyber assets in lieu of kinetic weapons

208

Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the Jus in Bello
when collateral and incidental effects can be limited. 104 That said, it will be critically important to carefully analyze the effects of such operations, particularly
their reverberating effects, when assessing an attack's compliance with the principle of proportionality. This will require planning, legal, and computer experts
to operate in concert throughout the targeting cycle. lOS
Finally, much as CNA challenges existing notions of "attack," it will also test
traditional understanding of combatant status. This results from the use of typically civilian technology and know-how to conduct military operations via
computer. Failure to strictly comply with the limitations on the participation of
civilians in hostilities will inevitably lead to heightened endangerment of the civilian population and weaken humanitarian law norms.
So the jury remains out. While humanitarian law in its present form generally
suffices to safeguard those it seeks to protect from the effects of computer network attack, and even though it offers the promise of periodically enhancing
such protection, significant prescriptive fault lines do exist. Thus, as capabilities
to conduct computer network attacks increase, both in terms of sophistication
and availability, continued normative monitoring is absolutely essential. We
must avoid losing sight of humanitarian principles, lest the possible in warfare
supplant the permissible.
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